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Government-owned banks represent the smallest number of banks in Indonesia (25% of all banks) but 
have a dominant market share of almost 50% in the loan market. Studies previous to this one do not 
address the effect of size differences on the loan portfolio structures and performance of such banks. 
The objective of this study is to add to the literature in this area by determining whether small and 
large Indonesian government-owned banks differ in terms of their loan portfolio structures and 
performance. The study covers the 2003 to 2011 period. Descriptive statistics, univariate statistics and 
generalized least squares estimation are applied. The findings show that the loan portfolio structures 
and returns of small and large government-owned banks differ significantly. 
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Government owned banks (GBs) play a prominent 
role as financial intermediaries in Indonesia.  Data 
retrieved from the Bank Indonesia annual reports 
sourced from the Indonesian Banking Directory 
indicate that although representing just 25% of the 
overall number of banks in Indonesia, the GBs   
retained a dominant market share of almost 50% in 
the loan market over the period 2003 to 2011. 
Over the 2003-2011 periods, GBs in Indonesia 
were the major loan providers. The total amount of 
loans provided by GBs in 2011 was almost three 
times as much as that of other domestic banks  and 
nearly twice as much as that of foreign-owned Banks  
in Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2011). Therefore GBs 
dominate the Indonesian banking industry. 
  According to the Indonesian central bank 
classification, GBs comprise of state-owned banks 
(owned by central government) and regional 
development banks (owned by provincial/local 
governments). Table 1.1 shows that the state-owned 
banks are on average larger than regional 
development banks.  
 
Table 1.1 Asset size of Different Indonesian Banks - 2003 and 2011 
 
 
Source: Indonesian Banking Statistics 2003 and 2011 
Using the means of all government banks as the 
cut-off (column 3, Table 1.2), the State-owned banks 
formed large GBs whereas on the contrary the 
regional development banks formed small GBs. 
< 1 Trillion Rp  1-10 Trillion Rp 10-50 Trillion Rp > 50 Trillion Rp Total < 1 Trillion Rp  1-10 Trillion Rp 10-50 Trillion Rp > 50 Trillion Rp Total
State Owned Banks 0 1 1 3 5 0 0 0 4 4
Foreign Exchange Commercial Banks 8 17 9 2 36 1 18 7 10 36
Non-Foreign Exchange Commercial Banks 31 9 0 0 40 12 15 3 0 30
Regional Development Banks 10 15 1 0 26 0 14 11 1 26
Joint Venture Banks 7 13 0 0 20 0 6 8 0 14
Foreign Banks 3 3 5 0 11 0 4 3 3 10
Total 59 58 16 5 138 13 57 32 18 120
Percent of Total 0,43 0,42 0,12 0,04 1,00 0,11 0,48 0,27 0,15 1,00
Bank Ownership Group
December 2003 December 2011




While previous studies highlight the weak 
performance of GBs compared to other bank 
ownership types (La-Porta et al. (2002), Barth et al. 
(2004), Sapienza (2004), Berger et al. (2005a) and 
Taboada (2011)), no such research distinguishes 
between the effect of size differences between GBs  
on their  loan portfolios. The only retrieved previous 
research  which finds that bank loan portfolios are 
determined by bank characteristics such as ownership 
and size was conducted by De-Haas et al. (2010). 
They did not specifically refer to GBs but indicated 
that large banks in general possess a comparative 
advantage in lending to large customers as they are 
able to exploit economies of scale in evaluating the 
“hard-information” borrowers.  In contrast, small 
banks may not be able to lend to large borrowers 
because of size limitations and regulatory lending 
limit constraints. However, they are better at dealing 
with “soft information” borrowers such as consumers 
and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs).  
 
Table 1.2. Means of Government-owned Banks Total Assets (In Million Rupiah) 
 
Year State-owned Banks Regional Development Banks All GBs 
2003 125,000,000 2,586,841 18,900,000 
2004 128,000,000 3,018,909 19,600,000 
2005 138,000,000 4,060,576 22,000,000 
2006 158,000,000 6,092,949 25,700,000 
2007 181,000,000 6,484,202 29,800,000 
2008 207,000,000 7,068,015 33,200,000 
2009 242,000,000 7,616,221 38,900,000 
2010 278,000,000 9,128,837 45,000,000 
2011 331,000,000 11,600,000 54,200,000 
All Years 198,000,000 6,405,776 31,900,000 
 
The objective of this study was to use bank level 
information to determine the extent to which large 
and small GBs differ in terms of their loan portfolio 
composition, risk and performance. 
Findings from this research show that the 
economic sector (EHHI) loan portfolio concentration 
of the large and small GBs differ over the total study 
period with small GBs being more concentrated, and 
showing an increase in concentration over the period 
2003 to 2011.  However, the loan types (THHI) 
portfolio concentration for all GB sizes are very 
similar and do not change much over the period 2003 
to 2011. Small GBs have more focused loan portfolios 
but experience lower risk and higher return. These 
findings support the corporate finance theory, 
according to which banks should implement focus 
strategies to reduce agency problems and exploit their 
management expertise in certain sectors. The findings 
do not support the traditional banking and portfolio 
theory that banks should diversify their loan portfolio 
to reduce risk (Hayden et al., 2006). 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Bank loan portfolio diversification strategies are 
based on the modern portfolio theory of Markowitz 
(1952), and largely followed by experts in financial 
institutions (Winton, 1999). According to the 
idiosyncratic risk hypothesis, diversification 
eliminates the specific (idiosyncratic) risk which 
enable banks to reduce their monitoring efforts and 
therefore lower their operating costs, which ceteris 
paribus should lead to higher cost efficiency (Rossi et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, the benefit of diversification 
stems from economies of scope across inter alia  
economic sectors and geographic areas (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007).  
Researchers like Hayden et al. (2006), Berger et 
al.(2010) and Tabak et al. (2011) all indicate that risk 
reduction and performance improvement are 
advantages of diversification whilst agency problems 
are common associated disadvantages.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned,  Tabak et al. 
(2011) also indicates that diversification  increases the 
risk in the Brazil and Italian banking sectors and 
reduces the performance of the banks in China, 
Germany and small European countries. This 
viewpoint, that diversification does not always reduce 
risks and improve returns, is also supported by other 
researchers like Winton (1999) and Acharya (2002). 
Some of the regulations governing central banks 
like maximum lending limits that apply to banks,  
promote diversification, whilst other regulations  
pertaining to aspects like branching, entry, and asset 
investments  often encourage focus strategies (Berger 
et al., 2010). However, the existence of regulations 
that  instigate diversification may increase monitoring 
costs and reduce cost efficiency due to large numbers 
of individual customers and industries (Rossi et al., 
2009). Furthermore, given that managers are risk 
averse, they may incur additional costs in their search 
for high quality loans to apply diversification. These 
factors may reduce diversification risk-return 
efficiency. 
A focus strategy opposed to a loan portfolio 
diversification strategy is effective when banks face 
information asymmetry (Acharya et al., 2002), Kamp 
et al. (2005),Berger et al. (2010), Tabak et al. (2011)) 
and it serves as a contributing determinant of 
differences between banks in terms of their loan 




concentration in sectors (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 
2004). Re-allocation of loans (commonly known as 
flight to captivity) to sectors where greater adverse 
selection problems exist may happen when banks face 
mere intrinsic overall competition from other outside 
lenders entering the market. It means that more 
lenders may target borrowers in the same sectors 
subject to low information asymmetries. Therefore, 
existing informed lenders may have to deal with more 
captured (but also higher risk) borrowers that did not 
previously form part of their market in such sectors 
(Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2004)
1
. 
Bank size can be regarded as another 
determinant of bank loan portfolio composition. 
Researchers such as De-Haas et al. (2010) 
investigated bank size performance differences. Their 
findings show that bank size, bank ownership, and 
legislation that protect the rights of banks as creditors 
are important determinants of the loan portfolio 
compositions of banks.  According to Carter et al. 
(2004) the lending performance of small banks may 
be better than that of large banks due to factors such 
as   structure performance (SP), information 
advantage (IA), and relationship development (RD) 
theories. The SP theory relates to the industry or 
market structure in which banks operate. When 
operating in smaller markets with a limited number of 
competitors, small banks may experience higher 
interest income (Gilbert, 1984). The IA theory refers 
to the information accessibility and organisational 
structures of banks. Nakamura (1993, 1994) and 
Mester et al. (1999) point out those small banks have 
the advantage of credit information accessibility. 
Their flat organisational structures also allow better 
delegated borrower monitoring (Carter et al., 2004).  
Finally, the RD theory contrasts the relationship 
lending conducted by small banks using “soft 
information”  about borrowers with arms-length 
lending by large banks using “hard information of 
borrowers (Berger et al., 2005b). Small banks have 
the advantage of serving the “soft information” 
borrowers due to their ability to maintain a close 
relationship with the borrowers. 
Differences in the organisational structures and 
exposure to asymmetric information between small 
and large banks may result in  different loan portfolio 
compositions (Degryse et al., 2012) and differences in 
lending technology and innovation capability (Berger 
et al., 2005a).  
In view of the aforementioned characteristic 
differences between bank sizes that researchers 
identified, it is hypothesized that differences exist in 
the loan portfolio composition and loan repayment 
default risk of different sizes of GBs. As a result their 
returns may also differ.        
 
                                                          
1
 Flight to captivity implies that banks re-allocate their 
portfolio towards more captive borrowers when shocks to 
their balance sheet, or from their competitive environment, 
force them to alter their lending patterns 
A Brief History of Government-owned 
Banks in Indonesia 
 
The major reform of the Indonesian banking industry 
commenced with the enactment of the Banking Act 
No 14/1967. One year after the reforms which started 
in 1967, seven separate government-owned banks 
were established, each governed by their own laws. 
They were established to develop specific sectors of 
the national economy
2
 with specific segment 
allocation for each one.   
Throughout the 1970s, banking was dominated 
by GBs. Although foreign bank branches established 
in 1968 still existed, the industry remained closed to 
new entries. As a result, GBs did not face competition 
from other banks (Bennet, 1999). They were often 
required by policy makers to direct their loans to 
certain customers. This was known as “memo 
lending” or “lending on the basis of a 
recommendation from a prominent or politically well-
connected person” (Bennet, 1995). High officials of 
the GBs were appointed by senior politicians. Thus, to 
maintain the security of their jobs, they compromised 
bank loan portfolio quality. Memo lending resulted in 
improper loan assessment which led to providing 
loans to non-credible companies that did not have the 
ability to repay the loans. Further, McLeod (1996) 
reported that the lending policy of GBs targeted state 
enterprises that were obliged to rely on GBs, not only 
for their financing but also for their investments.  
In 1974, the government introduced control over 
bank lending, as a major element of the banking 
policy regime (Arndt 1974 quoted in McLeod 
(1996)). It was a mechanism according to which 
interest rate ceilings were allocated to different 
economic sectors. The Central Bank therefore 
directed the allocation of bank credit to different 
sectors (Chant and Pangestu, 1994). 
During the period of the oil boom (1973-1982), 
the GBs enjoyed the supply of funds by the Central 
Bank at low interest rates. This made it possible for 
them to grant loans to economic sectors at a low rate. 
The mechanism was planned by the government to 
spread the income generated from oil to sectors 
targeted by the government. It enhanced the 
fulfilment of the social motives of government banks 
(McLeod, 1996). 
After the sharp decline of oil prices (which 
generated the main Indonesian export income) in 
1982, the government realized the need to create more 
efficient banking. The main objectives of the reform 
actions were to cease the subsidized lending program 
and to create a more market-oriented banking system. 
The reform process consisted of the termination of 
                                                          
2
The specific sectors/activities served by each of the seven 
newly formed State-owned banks were: Bank Negara 
Indonesia-manufacturing, Bank Dagang Negara-mining, 
Bank Bumi Daya - agriculture and forestry, Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia-agriculture and fishing, Bank Ekspor Impor - 
foreign trade, Bank Tabungan Negara-national saving bank, 
and Bapindo-national development bank (see: Bennet, 1990). 




providing liquidity credit to GBs, removal of interest 
rate controls (as the consequence of the termination of 
the subsidized-lending program), and abandonment of 
lending controls (Mc Leod, 1996). 
The intention with the abandonment of lending 
control was to enable GBs to take independent loan 
portfolio decisions based on their ability to attract 
deposits. It also pushed the GBs to compete with 
other banks since subsidised interest rates no longer 
existed. The Central Bank loans to GBs remained 
high (Mc Leod, 1996). There was little improvement 
in the efficiency of GBs and they maintained their 
focus on serving government-owned enterprises and 
neglected the retail markets (Cole and McLeod quoted 
in Mc Leod, 1996). 
The bank reform package introduced by the 
Central Bank in October 1988, known as PAKTO 
1988, relaxed many bank establishment regulations to 
foster competition in the banking industry. As a 
result, the Indonesian banking industry witnessed an 
accelerated increase in the number of banks. The 
private-owned banks were able to perform the 
intermediary functions better than government-owned 
banks. After the deregulations the GBs still engaged 
in politically motivated loans. In many of the cases, 
there were inadequate loan assessment (Bennet, 
1999). GBs lent mostly to affiliated companies which 
led to high risk exposure arising from highly 
correlated risk between the bank and the borrowers, 
since they were all in the same corporate groups.  
They used various means to fund affiliated companies 
in excess of the lending limit regulations (Bennet, 
1999). 
The period since the implementation of  the 
1988 banking package, up to the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, was characterised by the reduction of GB 
domination and market mechanisms were applied to 
set interest rates and loan allocations (Bennet, 1999). 
These mechanisms were mainly by way of the 
Banking Act (BL 7/ 1992) that was introduced in 
October 1992. Requirements for GBs and domestic-
owned banks were made the same to create a more 
competitive banking industry. The legal status of GBs 
was transformed to limited liability companies to 
become private corporations (Pangestu, 2003). The 
Banking Act abolished the GBs obligations to allocate 
credit to support government projects (Harun, 2008). 
The extensive growth in the number of banks during 
this period of time also brought contemporary 
problems along. Most of the banks did not apply 
adequate risk management and engaged in risky 
lending practices. As a result, banks experienced high 
levels of non-performing loans (Bennet, 1999). The 
asset quality of both government-owned and private-
owned banks deteriorated significantly. 
At the end of 1993, the NPLs of the largest GBs 
reached 21 percent of total loans (Bennet, 1999). 
There were no deposit insurance schemes in Indonesia 
at that time. The Central Bank performed the function 
of lender of last resort and protected the large 
government-owned banks under the “too-big to fail” 
policy. 
The closure of sixteen banks in November 1997 
marked the commencement of the Indonesian banking 
crisis. The restructuring of the banking sector 
(November 1997-2000) took the form of bank 
liquidations; bank mergers; bank close-downs;  and 
bank re-capitalization at a huge cost to the 
government (Alijoyo et al. (2004) and Batunanggar 
(2002)). The number of government-owned and 
private-owned banks reduced. Some of the former 
domestic-owned banks temporarily became 
government-owned banks but  the government’s 
shares in those banks were sold off again during 
2000-2002 period (Sato, 2005).   
 
3. Research Methodology  
 
3.1 Sample, Types and Sources of Data 
 
All Indonesian GBs (4 large GBs and 26 small GBs) 
that operated over the 2003 to 2011 period were 
included in this research.  This constitutes a total 
observation of 270 (30 banks for 9 years). One large 
bank (Bank Ekspor Indonesia) that only existed for a 
part of the research period (from August 1999 to 1 
September 2009) was excluded. This research utilised 
secondary data from The Indonesian Central Bank 
Library, Infobank magazine and the library of The 
Indonesian Banking Development Institute (LPPI). 
The central bank library provides individual bank 
ownership data and financial statements whereas 
Infobank magazine provides loan allocation data 
based on loan types and economic sectors. 
Information from LPPI also supplements loan 
allocation data not provided by Infobank magazine. 
 





Table 3.1 reflects all the variables, their definitions 













Table 3.1. Variables Definition and Measurement 
 
 Variable Definition Measurement Remarks 
1 Loan Portfolio 
Concentration 
(CONC) 
The risk arising from an uneven 
distribution of counterparties in credit 
or any other business relationships or 
from a concentration in business sectors 
or geographical regions which is 
capable of generating losses large 
enough to jeopardise an institution’s 
solvency (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006) 










Q ∑   
  
    
 
   = the percentage of 
credit to each sector 
  = 10 for  E-HHI and 
3 for THHI 
2 Loan Portfolio 
Payment Default 
Risk (RISK) 
A different risk inherent to each 






3 Loan Portfolio 
Return  (RETR) 
The net income obtained from bank’s 
loan portfolio  
Gross Interest 
Income/ Total Loans 
 
4 Interest Rate 
(INT.RATE) 
The money paid by a borrower (debtor) 
for the use of money that they borrow 
from a lender (creditor) 
1-month SBI Rate  The end of year SBI 




The market value of all officially 
recognized final goods and services 
produced within a country in a year, or 
other given period of time 




The dependent variable in this research is the 
loan portfolio return of GBs measured by the ratio of  
gross interest income to  total loans. Three 
independent variables are used: bank size, loan 
portfolio concentration and loan repayment default 
risk. Interest rate and GDP serve as the 
macroeconomic variables. Banks are categorised into 
two size groups, being large state-owned banks, and 
small regional development banks. The categories 
were established by using the means of all 
government-owned banks as a cut-off point, with 
dummy variables (1 for large GBs and 0 otherwise) to 
identify the two sizes. The loan portfolio 
concentration was measured using the Hirschman 
Herfindahl Index (HHI). It was also used by Winton 
(1999), Acharya et al. (2002) and Hayden et al. 
(2006).3 For this research, two types of HHI’s are 
applied, namely Economic Sector HHI (E-HHI) and 
Loan Type HHI (T-HHI). The loan repayment default 
risk is measured by the ratio of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) to total loans. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 
All research data is numerical, therefore quantitative 
data analysis was undertaken.  Firstly, descriptive 
statistics of the variables (means and standard 
deviations) were calculated to determine data 
tendency and deviations. Secondly, univariate 
statistics in the form of the test of mean were used to 
                                                          
3
 The Indonesian economic sectors to which banks can lend 
are 10. Central bank classification as follows: Agriculture, 
hunting and agricultural facilities; Mining; Manufacturing; 
Electricity gas and water; Construction; Trade, restaurants 
and hotels; Transportation, warehousing and 
communications; Business services; Social services; others. 
The loan types are three, namely: working capital, 
investment, and consumption. 
find the differences in loan portfolio composition, risk 
and return of small and large GBs.  The Mann-
Whitney non-parametric test was applied since the 
data was not normally distributed. Thirdly, to 
determine the impact of bank size, loan portfolio 
composition and loan repayment default on portfolio 
returns, the following panel data regression equation 
was used: 
 
                                   
                                                        (3.1) 
       
        = loan portfolio return for bank i in year t 
       = size dummy 
       = economic sector loan portfolio 
concentration   
       = loan type portfolio concentration   
      = loan portfolio default payment risk for 
bank i at year t 
     ,  = regression coefficients; and 
    = the disturbance term. 
This research employs the feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS) estimation in the panel data 
regression since independent variable collinearity was 
verified. FGLS allows for heteroskedasticity and has 
two unique features: modelling of cross-sectional 






Table 4.1 details the summary statistics for the 
variables in the equation 3.1. The first part presents 
the descriptive statistics regarding loan allocation 
based on economic sectors and loan types. The 
variation for loans allocated to each sector (standard 




deviation of EHHI) is higher than that for loan types. 
The standard deviation for loan allocation to each 
sector is higher than that of loan types. The average 
gross NPL percentage of small GBs of 2.314% is low 
in contrast to the average gross NPL percentage of 
large GBs of 5.332%. By analyzing the mean and the 
standard deviation of HHI as concentration measure, 
it can be seen that loan portfolios based on economic 
sectors are less concentrated than portfolios based on 
loan types for both small and large GBs. It cannot be 
compared directly since there are only three loan 
types compared to the ten different identified 
economic sectors. However, both measures show that 
overall the large GBs loan portfolios seem to be more 
diversified than that of the small GBs.  
Table 4.1 shows that although small GBs have 
the highest concentration risk based on sectors and 
loan types, they have lower loan repayment default 
risk and higher returns. As stated by Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2006), focusing on specific segments 
may create concentration risk but as long as the 
targeted sector consists of  high quality borrowers 
with low intrinsic risk, it may result in high return. As 
the small GBs focus on consumer loans with many 
direct salary deductions for loan repayments (see 
Figure 4.5), the associated payment default risk is 
low. Consumer loans provide small GBs with high 
return since the interest rate earned from this segment 
is, based on data from Indonesian Statistics Bureau 
(www.bps.go.id), approximately 1.5-2 % higher than 
that of other types of financing. 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables 
 
Variables Large GBs (N=36) Small GBs (N=234) 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
I. LOAN PORTFOLIO STRUCTURE: COMPOSITION     
Based  on Economic Sectors:     
Agriculture 0.068191 0.052665 0.034942 0.068018 
Mining 0.022139 0.024522 0.001965 0.006945 
Manufacturing 0.180098 0.144999 0.010324 0.013830 
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.018893 0.018663 0.005794 0.029015 
Constructions 0.148913 0.302377 0.055674 0.070526 
Trade, hotel, and restaurants 0.159366 0.115836 0.115937 0.104866 
Transportation and Communication 0.029779 0.027212 0.009723 0.015698 
Business Services 0.056795 0.037919 0.045757 0.113680 
Social Services 0.008278 0.009092 0.026857 0.099949 
Others 0.307548 0.281297 0.693029 0.228094 
Based on Loan Types:     
Working Capital 0.452313 0.224230 0.193315 0.150502 
Investment 0.195630 0.150543 0.085162 0.088688 
Consumption 0.352057 0.319355 0.721523 0.205866 
II. LOAN PORTFOLIO STRUCTURE: CONCENTRATION     
By Economic Sector (EHHI) 0.389398 0.321598 0.597555 0.206989 
By Loan Types (THHI) 0.536872 0.174982 0.637804 0.178287 
III. LOAN PORTFOLIO RISK     
Payment Default  Risk (RISK) 0.053319 0.044656 0.023141 0.022903 
IV. RETURN (RETR)     
Gross Interest Income Ratio 0.190357 0.055973 0.236316 0.093927 
 
Loan Portfolio Concentration and 
Composition: Small and Large 
Government-owned Banks 
 
Loan Portfolio concentration that represents the extent 
to which banks apply and focus on loan 
diversification is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). The loan portfolio 
concentration of small and large GBs based on 
economic sectors (EHHI) and loan types (THHI) is 
graphically depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
Economic Sector Bank Loan Portfolio 
Concentration (EHHI) 
 
Differences exist between the EHHI of small and 
large GBs with small GBs being the most 
concentrated and showing an increase in 
concentration over the period 2003 to 2011.  In 
contrast, the EHHI concentration levels of large GBs 
tend to decrease over the research period (Figure 4.1). 
These findings indicate the overall tendency of large 















Loan Type (THHI) Bank Loan Portfolio 
Concentration  
 
The average loan type concentration levels (THHI) of 
small and large GBs are depicted in Figure 4.2. From 
2003 to 2007, the THHI levels of both small and large 
GBs are very similar and do not change much. It is 
only from 2008 onwards that the concentration levels 
show definite changes. Small GBs tend to become 
more concentrated whilst the loan portfolios of large 
GBs become more diversified.  
 





Loan Portfolio Composition: Small and 
Large Government-owned Banks 
 
In terms of loan allocation, small GBs are the major 
players in providing loans to unspecify others (last 
category of the economic sectors that primarily refers 
to consumers). 
Consumer loans represent the majority of small 
GB loans with only a very small portion of loans 
allocated for working capital and investments. Large 
GBs become more involved in financing different 
business sectors with working capital becoming their   
most prominent type of finance as confirmed in 
Figure 4.5.  
These findings serve as a good indicator that 
regional development banks (small in size) and state-
owned banks (large in size) differ in their market 
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Loan Portfolio Performance (Risk and 
Return) of Large vs Small Government-
owned Banks  
 
According to Cronje (2013) loan portfolio risks are 
classified into two broad categories namely intrinsic, 
and concentration risk. Within the context of this 
study intrinsic risk refers to the risk inherent to each 
sector, and each loan type of a bank. Intrinsic risk 
cannot be measured in this study since comparative 
risk information like loan defaults for each sector and 
each loan type is not available. Only loan repayment 
default information, provided in the form of NPLs for 
the total loan portfolio is available for individual 
banks and is used as proxy of overall bank loan 
portfolio risk. In this research, the ratio of gross NPLs 
to Total Loans (TLs) is used as the proxy for loan 
repayment default risk (See Figure 4.7). The higher 
the NPL percentage, the higher the loan portfolio risk. 
 
Figure 4.7 Loan Repayment Default o Risk of Small and Large Government-owned Banks for the period 
2003 to 2011 
 
 
The NPLs of the small and large GBs differs the 
most from each other in 2006, but the differences 
decrease with minor NPL differences remaining in 
2011. The gross NPLs of large GBs are higher than 
that of the small GBs over the entire period. It is 
interesting to note that the NPLs of large GBs spike in 
2005 and 2006 (prior to the GFC) whilst after the 
commencement of the GFC it decreased every year. 
On the other hand, small GBs experience a decrease 
in gross NPLs over the total study period with no 
increase associated with the GFC. Overall, (except for 
the 2005 and 2006 spikes in the NPLs of large GBs) 
the NPLs for both the small and large banks show a 
decreasing trend from 2003 to 2011. It indicates that 
the overall credit risk of banks decreases and that the 
quality of their loan portfolios improved over the 
































































































To measure the loan portfolio return, the ratio of 
gross interest income to total loans is used in this 
research since in the broader sense it reflects the 
comparative pricing applied by banks. The ratio of 
gross interest income to total loans, after loan 
repayment defaults, constitutes the actual achieved 
return.     
Figure 4.8 depicts the gross interest income ratios for 
small and large GBs over the period 2003-2011. In 
general, both small and large GBs experience a 
downward trend in their gross interest income from 
2003 to 2011. This is due to changes in the central 
bank interest rate (Central bank rate serves as the 
reference rate since 2005, hence no data available 
prior to 2005) (from 12.75% in 2005 to 6% in 2011). 
It affects all banks but notwithstanding such changes, 
banks still apply different rates based on inter alia 
their specific market segments and supply and 
demand for the loans that they provide.  Small GBs 
show the highest gross interest income in all years. 
Considering this situation, small GBs in general have 
a higher average return than large GBs over the nine 
year research period. The result is in line with the 
findings of Carter et al. (2004) that small banks earn 
higher returns than large banks due to their 
performance structure, information advantage and  
development of relationships with customers. 
However, the findings of Carter et al. (2004) is based 
on  the  risk adjusted yield of return whereas this 
research uses the gross interest income to total loans 
ratio.  
 
Differences in the Loan Portfolio 
Structure and Performance of Small and 
Large Government-owned Banks 
 
Table 4.2 displays the results of the Mann-Whitney 
test performed to verify the descriptive statistics 
findings presented in the previous section of this 
paper with regard to the differences in the loan 
portfolio structure and performance of small and large 
GBs.   
The Mann-Whitney test shows that there are 
statistically significant differences in the EHHI and 
THHI loan portfolio concentration and in the loan 
portfolio performance (risk and return) of small and 
large GBs.  It therefore confirms that size does matter 
in explaining the loan portfolio structures and the 
performance of GBs in Indonesia. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Univariate Statistics for the Loan Portfolio Structure and Performance of Small and Large 
Government-owned Banks 
 
 Large Banks (n=36) Small Banks (n=234) Difference Mann-Whitney Test 
     Z Prob> Z 
EHHI 0.3894 0.5976 -0.2082*** 4.78 0.0000 
THHI 0.5369 0.6378 -0.1009*** 3.373 0.0007 
Risk 5.3319 2.3141 3.0179*** -6.368 0.0000 
Return 0.1904 0.2363 -0.0459*** 3.959 0.0001 
Legend: The Mann-Whitney tests are conducted for testing the loan portfolio structure and performance median differences 
between the small and large GBs over the nine-year study period. Statistically significant differences at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels  are respectively indicated by  ***, **, and *.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Table 4.3 presents the FGLS used to determine the 
relationship between GB sizes, their EHHI and THHI 
loan portfolio concentration levels and their loan 
repayment default risk (loan portfolio risk) with their 
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Table  4.3 FGLS: Relationship between Bank Size; Loan Portfolio Structures; and Loan Portfolio Risk 
with Loan Portfolio Return 
 
  Loan Portfolio Return 
CONSTANT Coefficient 0.5894*** 
z-Statistic 10.52 
P-value 0.000 
SIZE Coefficient -0.0555*** 
z-Statistic -3.59 
P-value 0.000 
EHHI Coefficient -0.0330 
z-Statistic -0.75 
P-value 0.454 
THHI Coefficient 0.0145 
z-Statistic 0.26 
P-value 0.796 
NPL Coefficient 0.0014 
z-Statistic 0.76 
P-value 0.447 
INT.RATE Coefficient -0.0020 
z-Statistic -0.81 
P-value 0.421 
GDP Coefficient 0.0000*** 
z-Statistic -8.50 
P-value 0.000 
Number of observations  270 
Number of banks  30 
Legend: This table present the FGLS of equation 3.1.  The dependent variable is Loan Portfolio Return (Gross Interest 
Income - Intinc). The independent variables are bank sizes (small and large GBs), loan portfolio concentration based on 
economic sector (EHHI) and based on loan types (THHI), and loan repayment default (NPL), interest rate and GDP. 
The table contains coefficients, z-statistics and P-values from FGLS regression with year dummy.  Definitions of 
variables are provided in Table 3.1. ***, **, and * respectively correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
 
Table 4.3 shows that Size and GDP significantly 
affect loan portfolio returns. The negative coefficients 
of the size dummy regressors show that the 
relationship of large GBs with loan portfolio returns is 
less than that of small GBs. The 1% statistical 
significance of the size coefficient provides evidence 
that the size of GBs does affect loan portfolio returns. 
The estimation result also support the previous 
descriptive analysis which shows that the loan 
portfolio returns of small GBs are better than that of 
large GBs. Finally, the positive and significant 
relationship between GDP and loan portfolio return 
represents the impact of economic cycles on the 
portfolio return from market segments that banks 




Previous research like that of De-Haas et al. (2010)  
indicates that bank size is one of the bank loan 
portfolio determinants, as it  may affect the market 
segment focus of banks. This paper attempts to 
determine whether large and small GBs differ in 
terms of their loan portfolio composition, risk and 
performance. 
The findings support the hypotheses that small 
and large GBs differ with regard to loan portfolio 
composition, risk and return. The loan portfolios of 
small GBs are more concentrated with focus on the 
consumer sector whereas large GBs have more 
diversified loan portfolios with more exposure to the 
trade and manufacturing sectors although a high level 
of concentration in the consumer sector started in 
2007. The prominent consumer sector exposure do 
not support findings of previous research like Mian 
(2003) that indicate the role of GBs to be primarily 
for financing  or subsidizing of social projects. This is 
not surprising since the legal status of GBs was 
transformed to limited liability private companies 
with the introduction of the Banking Act BL 7/ 1992 
in October 1992. Regulations for government-owned 
banks and private-owned domestic banks were 
aligned  to create a more competitive banking 
industry (Pangestu, 2003). Furthermore, after the 
implementation of the 1992 Banking Act, GBs were 
no longer forced to allocate credit to support 
government projects. Considering these legislation 
changes large GBs became more involved in 
financing different business sectors with working 
capital becoming their most prominent type of loans 
compared to the consumer loans of the small GBs. 
However, since 2007 large GBs also entered the 
consumer loan market extensively due to the fact that 
it is a higher priced and safer market segment. 




The gross NPLs of large GBs is higher than that 
of the small GBs over the entire period but overall, 
(except for the 2005 and 2006 spikes in the the NPLs 
of large GBs) the NPLs for both the small and large 
banks show a decreasing trend from 2003 to 2011. 
Regulation PBI 2/11/PBI/2000 jo PBI 15/2/PBI/2013 
of the Central Bank that implemented a 5% standard 
for the net NPL ratio of banks may have prompted all 
GBs to adjust their credit risk assessment and/ or 
qualifying criteria for loans. The decrease in the 
overall NPLs of Indonesian banks may also result 
from the prudential regulations like productive asset 
quality, loan loss provision, and loan restructuring 
enacted by the Central Bank since 2003 (Indonesian 
Banking Booklet, 2003 and 2011). On the other hand, 
it may also be complimented by external economic 
factors not researched in this study.  
Differences in the loan portfolio composition 
and concentration risk of GBs result in different loan 
portfolio returns. Small GBs show a higher loan 
portfolio return compared to the large GBs. Focusing 
on segments with low intrinsic risk provides small 
GBs with a better return. The findings support the 
corporate finance theory according to which banks 
should implement focus strategies to reduce agency 
problems and exploit their management expertise in 
certain sectors. The findings do not support the 
traditional banking and portfolio theory according to 
which banks should diversify their loan portfolio to 
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